Disagreement and Deference to Experts

Independence or Qualified Numbers?

Authors

Keywords:

peer disagreement, deference to experts, expertise, independence, testimony

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the debate regarding the Independence Belief principle and to investigate whether a novice’s deference to the majority opinion is rational. In the first section, we introduce the Independence Belief principle and some key definitions from the epistemology of expertise. In the second section, we explain Alvin Goldman's (2001) argument in defense of a version of the Independence Belief principle. In the third section, we explore both David Coady’s (2006, 2009) criticisms of Goldman’s argument and the argument from Jennifer Lackey (2013) against that principle. In the final section, we discuss Zach Barnett’s (2019) response to Lackey’s conclusion and his reflections on belief dependence.

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Published

2025-01-04