Os Limites da Autonomia Epistêmica

A Crítica de Linda Zagzebski ao Egoísmo Epistêmico

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss what epistemic autonomy is not, that is, a form of epistemic egoism, according to which the individual should rely and depend only on oneself in the pursuit of epistemic goods (cf. Fricker, 2006). I present Zagzebski's (2020) critique of epistemic egoism with which epistemic autonomy is often identified. According to Zagzebski, (a) there are no good reasons to take epistemic egoism as an ideal; (b) epistemic egoism is incoherent because it results in trust in others; (c) epistemic egoism has undesirable consequences for both the individual and the epistemic community, limiting the production of epistemic goods for both. Thus, a tension is revealed between the ideal of epistemic autonomy and the pursuit of truth. Zagzebski's argument of incoherence is compatible with the endorsement of anti-reductionism about testimony and anti-individualism regarding epistemic goods, but the author does not explicitly articulate the connection of her critique of epistemic egoism with these two theses. Therefore, I point to the parallel between Miranda Fricker's (2023) rejection of reductionism, due to its descriptive inadequacy (section 1), and Zagzebski's rejection of the ideal of autonomy, due to its normative inadequacy (section 2). Additionally, I suggest, as a complement to Zagzebski's critique, a diagnosis of what motivates the endorsement of the ideal of epistemic autonomy, considering that it is not the pursuit of truth that drives it. For this, I turn to Greco's (2021) conception of vicious intellectual pride (Section 2.4). Greco argues that epistemic individualism is a manifestation of the vice of epistemic pride and is committed to ideals and illusions of self-sufficiency, as well as to a notion of epistemic autonomy incompatible with epistemic dependence, quite similar to the ideal of epistemic autonomy as egoism, as Zagzebski conceives it. This approximation between Zagzebski’s and Greco’s ideas aims to explain what motivates the epistemic egoist to value oneself more than one values the truth. If this hypothesis is correct, the anti-individualistic tendency of contemporary epistemology can be seen as a welcome reorientation, which manifests the virtue of intellectual humility (opposed to vicious intellectual pride) and opens the way to reconceive epistemic autonomy in a way that is compatible with trust in others and epistemic dependence.