Expertise Filosófica como Expertise em Intuir
Palavras-chave:
epistemologia, expertise filosófica, intuition, progresso filosófico, entendimentoResumo
Intuições são impressões, pareceres ou experiências intelectuais que surgem para nós quando consideramos algo e esse algo parece verdadeiro ou falso. Proposições como 2 + 2 = 4; se um objeto é azul, então ele é colorido; torturar pessoas por diversão é moralmente errado; um sujeito não pode obter conhecimento por pura sorte, etc., são proposições que podem ser justificadas via intuições. Algumas dessas proposições são da alçada da filosofia, a saber, a proposição moral e a proposição sobre conhecimento. Os filósofos são experts no que fazem, mas o que é isso que eles fazem? É reconhecido na literatura que os filósofos tradicionalmente utilizam intuições como evidência para corroborar ou refutar uma tese. Com base na literatura da psicologia sobre expertise em intuir coletada por Elijah Chudnoff (2021), defendo que um tipo de expertise filosófica é a expertise em intuir. Pode-se objetar que essa maneira tradicional de fazer filosofia não gera progresso e isso pode ser visto no desacordo profundo que está presente na literatura filosófica. Contra essa objeção, respondo que pode haver progresso filosófico apesar do desacordo. Para tal, baseio-me em uma teoria do progresso que se conecta com a noção de entendimento desenvolvida por Finnur Dellsén (2021, 2022, 2023).
Palavras-Chave: Epistemologia, Expertise Filosófica, Intuição, Progresso Filosófico, Entendimento
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