Outlines for a metatheory of expertise from the veritistic approach and its main problems

Autores/as

  • João Batista Ferreira Filho pesquisador independente

Palabras clave:

Epistemology of Expertise, Veritism, Alvin Goldman

Resumen

Whenever we think of expertise we think of someone who is either in a better or worse epistemic position
than us regarding certain topic. Complications arise when we try to explain what makes expertise expertise: is
epistemic asymmetry sufficient? How to characterize such asymmetry? Is it a matter of having more true
beliefs (than)? These traits and others have already been claimed as defining features of expertise in many
theories that attempt to answer the question “what is expertise?”. It is my understanding that the enterprise of
providing a unified conception of expertise needs some clarification about what we should be looking for
when trying to answer the question of what expertise is. I aim to examine Alvin Goldman’s conception of
expertise and its most salient problems, then extrapolate from those to a few general concerns that could be
applied to competing theories of expertise. I end with a few provisional and expandable recommendations on
how to approach the problem of the concept of expertise from a metatheoretical point of view.

Citas

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Publicado

2025-01-04

Número

Vol. 16 Núm. 2 (2024): Dossiê: Dependência Epistêmica, 40 Anos Depois

Sección

Artigos

Licencia

Derechos de autor 2025 João Batista Ferreira Filho

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