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Abstract

In this article, I examine Hardwig's defense of epistemic dependence and trust, agreeing with his critique of epistemological individualism and his proposal to reformulate our conception of justified beliefs and rational individuals. I also support his view that certain knowledge belongs to a human community and not to an individual epistemic agent. However, I extend the implications of his defense of trust, which is inherent in the notion of epistemic dependence. I argue that trust should be explored beyond testimonial relationships and examples limited to scientific knowledge. According to Hardwig's own intuitions, knowledge is not just something we share, transmit or receive; it can be the result of joint agency. The clearest example of this joint agency is found in dialog or conversation. Moreover, shared knowledge has an epistemic value that goes beyond the accumulation of individual information. In a genuine dialog, participants dispute perspectives and revise their beliefs, which results in more robust and well-founded knowledge, essential for addressing complex issues where individual perspectives may be insufficient. To delve deeper, I explore Hardwig’s (1971) notion of “dialog among equals” in the context of moral problems. Applying this concept to epistemological issues offers a valuable framework for understanding how epistemic agents can collectively arrive at knowledge and resolve disagreements. I propose that knowledge obtained through cooperative dialog not only complements but also transcends the limitations of individual knowledge, asserting that epistemic trust and dependence are crucial both for the transmission of knowledge and for its collaborative creation and maintenance in an epistemic community.