EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND EXPERT

A CONTRAST

Abstract

Throughout the history of philosophy, there has been much discussion about the role of authority in practical, political, moral terms, etc. Little attention has been paid to a form of authority established from the epistemic domain, in order to understand how this type of authority operates in a relationship with a layman. Linda Zagzebski sought to substantiate this type of authority and successfully attempted to synthesize this concept into a concise argument that aimed to explain this form of authority in a broad way. Although Zagzebski's argument has brought many gains to a discussion about the role of epistemic authority, the author's argument about this type of authority does not seem sufficient to explain all the phenomena that encompass the relationship between a layman and someone who has more knowledge, especially when that someone is an expert or someone extremely qualified in a certain domain. To contrast these two figures, that is, the figure of epistemic authority and the figure of the expert, this article will seek to highlight the definitions of each of them, highlighting where they differ and what possible implications are considered in relation to these authorities, showing, finally, that an epistemic authority is a form of particular authority and that it does not have institutional force, such as the authority of an expert, within its domain of activity, and that, both the belief in epistemic authorities and in Experts seem to need a certain reflexivity from the layman so that they do not incur any imposition of knowledge or beliefs.