Epistemic Authorities, Preemption and Predatory Behavior
Schlagworte:
epistemic authority, preemption thesis, defeatist preemptionism, predatory authoritiesAbstract
As laypersons in most domains, we often rely on epistemic authorities to form our beliefs about the world. How exactly should we respond upon finding out what epistemic authorities believe about their various fields? Are we permitted to diverge from them, or should we always follow their lead on such matters? In this paper, I will defend a version of the Preemption Thesis, according to which we can rationally disagree with epistemic authorities concerning their domain only in a limited range of cases. After clarifying and delimiting the scope of the discussion, I will present an argument for the Preemption Thesis, and defend that argument from some objections. Finally, I will show why predatory epistemic authorities do not pose a problem for that version of the Preemption Thesis.
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