BRAZILIANS IN PORTUGAL, PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL: CONSTRUCTIONS OF
SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE

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In this essay, I seek to understand the contradictions, ambiguities, and accommodations underlying the remodeling of Portugal from an imperial metropolis to an European post-colonial nation. From this perspective, I examine the reconfigurations of sameness and difference between Portugal and Brazil, in the present conjuncture.

The first discloses a historical conjuncture of intense ideological disputes on “what the Portuguese nation should be”; and, the second indicates that the present configuration of Portuguese nationalism increasingly intersects with the politics of investments and the marketing of Portuguese high culture. Both acts bring to the fore the reconfigurations of the Portuguese empire and of the Portuguese “imperial mentality” in this present juncture of global capitalism.

So Portugal was the metropolis, Brazil [was] the colony. Portugal discovers and digs, gives birth to and raises Brazil and the ancestor becomes the brother of the descendent? What devil’s kind of kinship imbroglio is this one? (Figueiredo1880:45)
Central to my recollections of *Foreign Land*, a fictional movie on the recent migration of young Brazilians to Lisbon, is the powerful image of an old abandoned ship aground on a deserted Portuguese beach that served as a metaphor of cultural isolation. In the film, a young Brazilian woman exclaims, “As time passes by, I become more and more aware of my accent, [and] that the sound of my voice is an offense to their ears.” She conveys the feelings of otherness and, hence, the construction of *difference*.

Yet, if we consider that the cultural meanings engendered by images are mediated by our experiences, this metaphor of “cultural isolation” becomes just one among many meanings that could be ascribed to the abandoned old ship of *Foreign Land*. Actually, from my social location as a Brazilian anthropologist interested in comparing old and new Atlantic crossings of people, signs, and capital between Portugal and Brazil, this ship aground on a Portuguese beach (and not in any other country) acquires new and broader meanings. It becomes an allegory of five centuries of Portuguese colonialism, the phantom of an empire that unable to compete in the marketplace of global commerce, “distanced”
itself from Europe to engage in Atlantic projects— an empire directed, first towards colonizing and exploring Brazil (1640-1822), and then Portuguese Africa.

As an emblem of the Portuguese long-lasting decayed empire, the old ship aground provides a way of considering the contradictions, ambiguities, and accommodations underlying Portugal’s transformation from an imperial metropolis into a European post-colonial nation. At the time of the 1974 socialist Revolution of the Carnations, Portugal was the oldest and longest lasting colonial power of the world and the poorest nation in Europe (Santos 1993). The revolution overthrew the New State dictatorship and ended five centuries of Portuguese colonialism. Because its socialist projects were unable to cope with the demands of the emerging global economic order, those within the revolution who favored Portugal’s “return” to Europe gained power and, in 1981, the Portuguese postcolonial state joined the European Economic Community. From that location, governmental officials sought to transform Portugal into a prosperous and modern nation.

Portugal’s reterritorialization to its fifteenth century frontiers and, almost simultaneously, its deterritorialization to the bounded configuration of the European Community, led to the institutional processes of “undoing” the empire and at the same time “adjusting” the reconstruction of Portuguese nationalism to European communitarian norms. In 1981, in conformity with Portugal’s location within the supranational European block, Portuguese nationality began to be ascribed on the basis of “bonds of blood” and thus transmitted by descent rather than by birth in national territory. Since the new law favored the “rights to roots,” Portuguese transnational migrants were included in a “global” nation based on population instead of territory. At the same time, nationals of former colonies of Africa, who during late colonialism were at least theoretically entitled to Portuguese citizenship, began to be excluded from
the nation (Baganha and Góis 1999). A decade later, Portugal’s adhesion to Schengen further reaffirmed its European roots and made way for the promulgation in December 1992 of a new “Foreigners Law” restricting the entry of immigrants, including those arriving from former colonies, into the “fortress of Europe.” Nevertheless, the post-colonial state, continuing to focus on the former Portuguese imperial space, has further redefined its [bilateral] relations with Brazil, as well as with the now-independent nations of “Portuguese Africa.” Under the initial leadership of Brazilian diplomacy, this process led to the emergence of the supranational Community of Portuguese Language Countries, the CPLP which was eventually formalized in 1996.

Against the background of these seemingly contradictory developments, I am interested in examining, in two acts, the reconfigurations of sameness and difference between Portugal and Brazil, in the present context of global capitalism. The first act centers on the 1993 diplomatic conflicts between Portugal and Brazil when, upon the issuing of a new Foreigners Law in Portugal, “undesirable” Brazilians began to be detained by the Portuguese Foreigners and Frontiers Office and returned to Brazil. The second act, set in the late 1990’s, focuses on the recreations of Portugueseness among the Portuguese and Luso-Brazilian leadership of São Paulo as Portuguese enterprises and capital have increasingly headed to Brazil—a movement suggestively portrayed by the Brazilian media as the “Return of the Caravels.”

Most of all, the two acts described in this paper highlight the relevance of taking into account the reconfigurations of former imperial projects for understanding the ways in which the Portuguese post-colonial state has negotiated its position in the global economy. Since these interrelated sets of events signaled the contradictory and evolving relations between Portugal and Brazil, as well as their shifting
locations in the global economy after Portugal’s decolonization and turn to Europe, they evoked broad though differential media attention. To elucidate these two sets of liminal social situations, I resort to the extended case method and view media coverage as a constitutive part of the analysis and, also, a way of guiding the ethnographic narrative (Van Velsen 1967). Yet, the formulation of the drama’s script is grounded on long term ethnographic and archival research – including newspapers material - intended at comparing the older Portuguese migration to São Paulo (Brazil) with the more recent transmigration of Brazilians to Lisbon (Portugal). Such a comparison has further unfolded from my long-term research among the Portuguese of New England (USA).

When I started fieldwork research among the Portuguese of New England (USA), I was able to grasp especially one dimension of the reconfiguration of the Portuguese post-colonial nation – that related to the so-called “Immigrant Portugal.” From that viewpoint, I adopted a transnational perspective on migration (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 1994) and documented the incorporation of Portuguese emigrants in the creation of a global deterritorialized post-colonial nation based on population rather than territory. My findings corroborated those of interlocutors who were examining the projects of nation-state reconstruction of former colonies (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc 1994; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2000). However, as Portugal is a former [albeit decaying] Empire, I further recognized that the construction of a global nation spread across the world has been rooted on the reinvention of the collective memory of saudade (nostalgia for the discoveries) as the basis of Portuguese national (imperial) identity. On that account, I suggested that the inclusion of the Portuguese diaspora into the post-colonial “global” nation has replaced the former
overseas colonies in the spatial (re) imagining of the former space of the Empire (Feldman-Bianco 1992, 1995).

As I turned to further compare the reversed transmigrations in-between Brazil and Portugal, I sought to combine the transnational perspective on migration with that of Santos’ (1995) stand on the need for taking into account Portugal’s semi-peripheral positioning in the wider economy to scrutinize its alleged lack of differentiation with former colonies, particularly in relation to Brazil. From that standpoint, I also engaged in dialogues with students of the so-called post-colonial moment, who have tended to examine yet another dimension of the national redefinition process— that referring to the presence of immigrants from former colonies in the ex- imperial metropoles. Given their interests in the supplementary narrations of the nation (Bhabba 1994) and, thus, in building histories that challenge the constructed homogeneities (C. Hall 1996), they have emphasized the cultural production of difference.

In contraposition, my option to compare two different diasporic situations in between Portugal and Brazil has enabled me to analyze both the incorporation of Portuguese transnational migrants into the nation, and Portugal’s transformation into a receiver of immigrants from its former colonies. From that vantage point, I came to realize that, in response to the restructuring of global capital and the formation of regional economic blocks, former European empires have also tended to redesign post-colonial nations that favor the bonds of descent and race. Yet, in view of an increase in control of territorial national borders regarding the entry of immigrants, including those arriving from their former colonies, there has been a simultaneous and interrelated process of reterritorialization into the “fortress Europe.”
Given the continuous production of ambiguous cultural borders between Portugal and Brazil, it became imperative to scrutinize the production of sameness, as well as of difference, between the two countries. Thus, instead of centralizing attention solely on the production of difference (Bhabha 1994, C. Hall 1996), my analysis will depict the ways in which homogeneity, i.e. hegemony has been constructed. Also, the complexities underlying the Atlantic crossings between Portugal and Brazil demanded a broader perspective on transnational migration – one that takes into account not only the movements of people, but also of symbols and capital. Moreover, a focus on the interdependencies and social fields that permeate these crossings aims at contributing to a better understanding of transnational movements between semi-peripheral countries linked by former colonial relations.

By placing the two-acts drama within this broader scenery, I attempt to juxtapose policies, politics, movements, and events concerning immigration and emigration in order to unfold the complexities underlying the relationships among transnationalism, diasporas, and processes of national redefinition in this era of contemporary globalization. Such an in-depth analysis has enabled me to examine both the immigration and emigration policies of the Portuguese post-colonial state as constitutive of the ways in which governmental officials have negotiated Portugal’s position in the global economy. From that perspective, I further elucidate how the sets of events portrayed in each act represent different moments of the remodeling of a Portuguese nationalism subjected to the European Union.

Since the interdependencies between imperial metropolis and different colonial sites have specific histories, positions, and relations of power, it is important to understand specific relationships between Brazil and Portugal within the broader space of empire. Through its explorations and
colonizations, this empire, forged by Portugal beginning in the 15th century, created a lusophonic domain of multiple locations. These domains not only produced wealth directly for Portugal, but also, because of the Brazilian need for slaves, propelled the Portuguese into becoming major slave traders in the Atlantic, uniting “through the ocean, the Brazilian enclaves, and the Angolan slave trading post into a singular colonial exploration system (Alencastro 2000:9). In the beginning of the 19th century, Brazil’s relationship to Portugal dramatically changed. After Napoleon invaded Portugal, King João VI fled to Brazil, transferring the seat of the empire to the colony. As the colony became “the center of the Empire and the metropolis the appendage of the colony,” there occurred an inversion of the colonial pact (Mota and Novaes 1982 cited in Santos 1993:28). Subsequent struggles in the Luso-Brazilian empire and the growing disintegration of the empire, which became economic and politically dominated by England, led to an ambiguous Brazilian independence in 1822 promulgated by the Portuguese heir, Dom Pedro, who became first king of Brazil and, later, of Portugal. After independence was granted, the use of a rhetoric of common descent has repeatedly produced ambiguous national borders between the two (brother) countries.

Simultaneously a colonizer and an empire dominated by more powerful states, beginning in the 19th century, Portugal further became an exporter of labor across the world – until the 1950’s, mostly to Brazil. However, under a nearly fifty-year long dictatorship (1926-1974), Portugal endeavored to reaffirm its sovereignty overseas by actively pursuing the reconstruction of the colonial empire in Africa and by creating an imperial mentality among the Portuguese. Later, in the early 1950’s, in response to widespread political pressures to decolonize, the colonies were transformed into overseas provinces, thus becoming officially parts of a single Portuguese nation. These institutional changes offered
citizenship only to the handful of the population of the provinces who were designated “assimilated.” At the same time, Lusotropicalism, the ideology formulated in the 1930’s by Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre that became the basis of Brazilian nationalism, was adopted as the New State official imperial doctrine and deployed in relation to its overseas colonies in Africa. Utilizing this ideology that praised Portuguese (and Brazilian) miscegenation and plasticity, state officials began to emphasize the similarities between colonizer and colonized. In this propaganda of sameness, the empire was “connected with the image of the nation itself, the sacred heritage of the Golden Age of the Discoveries, and the country’s own independence in relation to Spanish power on the Iberian Peninsula” (Alexandre 1998:58).

Since the mid-1980’s, in the context of processes of globalization of the economy, Brazil and Portugal began to confront new role reversals. On the one hand, Brazil—historically a nation composed of immigrants and the major destination of Portuguese immigrants—has also begun to export migrants across the world, including Portugal. On the other hand, upon the dissolution of its empire and full integration in the European Community, Portugal became a receiver of immigrants from Brazil as well as from its former colonies in Africa.

Brazilian immigrants arriving in Portugal differed drastically from those coming from the Portuguese speaking nations of Africa, in view of both their different colonial histories and the Brazilians’ higher socioeconomic, educational, and professional qualifications. At first, skilled professionals were enticed to provide technological assistance and training to the Portuguese in preparation for Portugal’s full integration in the European regional economic block. The demands from the E.U for major groundwork in Portugal and the envisioning of new opportunities within the European bounded space
also attracted enterprises and investments from Brazil. Possibilities of broader economic ventures further prompted the return of Portuguese capital and capitalists who had fled to Brazil upon the 1974 Revolution of the Carnations. All the while, Brazilian cultural goods, including popular TV soap operas, invaded the Portuguese market. In the mid-1980’s, however, Brazil entered prolonged economic crises. Increasing numbers of Brazilians began looking for a better life elsewhere, and Portugal was perceived as a “passageway to Europe.” It became particularly inviting to increasing numbers of qualified professionals. Although in smaller proportion, the former imperial metropolis also began attracting the so-called “undesirables”: Brazilian working-class men and women, as well as citizens involved in the transnational networks of drugs and prostitution. In the mid-1990s, upon the implementation of privatization policies by Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government, in a period coinciding with the celebrations of the so-called “discovery” of Brazil, there began [yet] another inverted crossing. Searching for new and major markets abroad, Portuguese enterprises and investments increasingly turned to Brazil, in a movement that suggestively became known as “The Return of the Caravels.”

Against the background of imperial reconfigurations, the 1993 diplomatic conflicts between Portugal and Brazil, in the first act, must be placed within a historical period marked by emerging European laws that consider transnational migrants as posing a problem of national (and supranational) security. These conflicts further highlight the dilemmas and cleavages among Portuguese governmental officials concerning the interplay between the European and the [former] Atlantic projects. In comparison, the second act, centering on “The Return of the Caravels” to Brazil in the late 1990’s, underscores the politics of inclusion and exclusion of the post-colonial state in relation to its diaspora.
Most of all, both acts highlight the reconfigurations of the Portuguese empire and of the Portuguese “imperial mentality” within global capitalism.

First Act - Diplomatic conflicts between Portugal and Brazil or a mere domestic drama?

Act portrays the conflicts, the mutual prejudices and accommodations that occurred from January 24 to the midst February 1993.

Leading protagonists: governmental officials, leading citizens of the Lisbon’s House of Brazil and the Luso-Brazilian Foundation for the Development of the Portuguese as well as leading citizens of the Federation of Portuguese, Luso-Brazilian associations of Rio d Janeiro, the São Paulo’s Council of the Portuguese Community; and “deported” Brazilians.

The setting: Airports of Lisbon and Porto

The curtain rises

The 1992 “Foreigners Law,” developed by the Ministry of Internal Administration, collided blatantly with the existing 1972 Bilateral Equal Rights Treaty between Portugal and Brazil. After President Mário Soares signed the new law in December 1992, “undesirable” Brazilians began to be deported from Portugal. The first news on the detention and maltreatment of eleven Brazilians arriving at the Lisbon Airport apparently caught the Brazilian government by surprise. While Brazilian diplomats objected to the Ambassador of Portugal in Brazil and the Brazilian media announced that the “Brazilian government does not accept Portugal’s reasoning,” Brazilian officials tried to minimize the incident, even though the deportations continued (Globo 1993 a). Claiming the Portuguese authorities had pledged
that the incidents at the airport were not motivated by any prejudice against Brazilians, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, [then] Minister of Foreign Relations, only demanded punishment for the Portuguese customs officers (Folha de São Paulo 1993b).

The diplomatic crisis between Brazil and Portugal unfolded a few days later just as the first eleven Brazilians barred from entering Portugal arrived in Brazil. It became clear that most belonged to Brazil’s poorest segments of the population, were either under-employed or unemployed in Brazil, and came from Governor Valadares, a Minas Gerais town with a large number of transnational migrants. A statement by the Portuguese Ambassador in Brazil, characterizing the deported as “vagrants and mulatinhas (mulatto women) wearing mini-skirts” made the news and escalated the crisis. The ambassador’s assertions prompted numerous protests and petitions in both Brazil and Portugal (Jornal do Brasil 1993b) The Portuguese and Luso-Brazilian [immigrant] Associations issued public statements in support of the Brazilian government.13

“Vagrants” and “mulattos” as well as “hordes of Blacks and little monkeys” are ways in which Portuguese from and in Portugal described Brazil’s population during the period Brazil declared its Independence (1822-1825) and the First Republic (1889-1930). These types of provocation differentiated civilized white Europeans from the “non-civilized” Brazilians, or “Portuguese from Brazil,” as the population from Brazil was called prior and during the Independence period (Ribeiro 1994b, 1999). These stereotypes, which were gendered as well as racist, began to be updated and recreated in Portugal in the 1980s, as the Portuguese confronted the competition of Brazilian immigrants - the so-called Brazucas - in the labor market. A cartoon illustrating a report by Norma Coury, entitled
“Portugal, Brazilians Hell”, that was published by Jornal do Brasil in 1988 captured the reaction in Portugal to the so-called invasion of Brazilian in the labor market.

Central to these stereotypes were notions of the Brazilian ginga (Brazilian swaying movement) and of “tropical sensuality” portrayed as inherent traits of the “mulatto woman.” These stereotypes were built upon images of Brazil readily available in Portugal because of the expanded popularity of imported Brazilian soap operas, and of the so-called “Brazilian culture” or “Brazilian nights” in disco bars, headed by Brazilians and (mostly) “Portuguese from Brazil.” This “Brazilian culture” for consumption, modeled upon Gilberto Freyre’s interpretations of the Brazilian national character, portrays Brazil as a “racial democracy” and the “mullato woman” as the exportable Brazilian national product. Moreover, these popularized images of Brazil, together with the Brazilian way of speaking the Portuguese language - provided a way for Brazilians (including those of Portuguese descent who recreate themselves as Brazilians) to reconstruct positively their personal and national differences in relation to the Portuguese.

Another cartoon, published just a few days after the Portuguese ambassador’s injudicious characterizations of the Brazilians detained at the Lisbon’s Airport, illustrated yet another Portuguese caravel, displaying Brazilian flags, attacked by all sorts of domestic utensils as it approaches Portuguese ground (Globo 1993e ). This cartoon captures the sense that the 1993 diplomatic conflicts were fundamentally a “domestic drama.” This drama has been constantly informed by reinterpretations of the interrelated histories of Portuguese colonialism and immigration in Brazil. These have been based on the recurring production of reciprocal stereotyping. Historically, in Portugal, stereotypes of Brazil and Brazilians were fabricated upon biased images of Brazil’s Portuguese immigrants (Vieira 1991). Since the 1980’s, the old cliches have been overlaid with negative characterizations of the “Brazuca, the “new”
Brazilian immigrant. As Portugal has returned to (white) Europe, characterizations of the “Brazucas” as tropical mulattos are based, once again, on race and degree of civilization.

Stories in the mass media exacerbated mutual stereotyping. Brazilian newspaper headlines claimed that “(Brazilian) Illegal (immigrants) confront prejudice and underemployment” (Folha de São Paulo 1993 c). All the while, Brazilians in Portugal developed a discourse that reflected their own hostilities towards Portugal and the Portuguese. Thus a politician, who entered Portugal as a tourist, complained that “the Portuguese are too backward,” reportedly asserting, “We are colonizing [Portugal]. Here the TV shows only Brazilian soap operas. Here is the ass of Europe!” Another was said to grumble about the impossibility of saving money in Portugal “where the cost of living is European but the salaries are Portuguese” (Folha de São Paulo 1993 c).

These representations of Portugal as more backward than Brazil recurred in the testimonies of Brazilians and even Luso-Brazilians settled in Portugal. Comments such as “Brazil is fifty years ahead of Portugal” served to restore the differences between the two countries. Such disparaging remarks were frequently included within stereotypical comic images, including recurrent jokes, about the Portuguese. Portrayals of the Portuguese as “ignorant” and “rude” were first fabricated in Brazil in the nineteenth century, at a time when slave labor began to be replaced by immigrant’s free labor, among whom were masses of Portuguese laborers (Ribeiro 1994, 1999; Rowland 1998; Vieira 1991). In the following decades, Portugal was defined either as the oppressive colonizer or exalted as the founder of the nation. Later, in the passage from monarchy to the First Republic in Brazil (1899-1930), old stereotypes were recreated. Portugal was characterized as a backward nation, while Portuguese immigrants were depicted as greedy businessmen blocking Brazil’s “progress” (Ribeiro 2000). Thus, the images of
Portugal and the Portuguese also have been mediated by stereotypes of Portuguese immigrants in Brazil. These mutual prejudices and hostilities, including allegations of national “superiority” and “inferiority” were exacerbated during the 1993 conflicts.

Against the background of such embittered mutual prejudices, Brazilian newspaper coverage began calling attention to the fact that “the Portuguese have all the privileges in Brazil” where “they don’t need a visa for a 90 days stay” (Folha de São Paulo 1993 d). It was further pointed out that, unlike the rigidity [with which] the Portuguese government has been treating Brazilian tourists,” the Portuguese were entitled to “obtain a permanent visa by just presenting a job offer or work project.” Yet, the Brazilian government only began threatening the Portuguese government with retaliation, after a public statement by the [then] Prime Minister Cavaco Silva that, “Portugal tries to combat the entry of drugs, criminality and marginality; especially, I am sorry to say it, of the transvestites” (Folha de São Paulo 1993 e). At the same time, he suggested, “The Brazilians should also apply the law against the Portuguese, since marginal and criminal people exist in Brazil as well as in Europe and we cannot be tolerant [with them]” (Folha de São Paulo 1993e ).

Because those statements were being broadly disseminated by the media, José Aparecido, the recently appointed Brazilian ambassador, attended an official event in Lisbon, “Against Racism and Discrimination,” as a special guest of President Mário Soares (Folha de São Paulo 1993f ). The political cleavages between Portugal´s Prime Minister and President became apparent. Although the intentions of both Cavaco e Silva and Mário Soares were to turn Portugal into a modern European nation, and the President had signed the Foreign Law, their strategies differed with respect to the reconfiguration of the former empire.
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva’s discourses and strategies to “Assert Portugal in the World” reflected Portugal’s alignment with and subordination to the European community’s policies. Hence, the formulation of the 1992 Foreign Law by the Ministry of Internal Administration reflected his stance towards Schengen. However, this law was also part of broader institutional changes that began in 1981 when the Portuguese government began to “undo the Empire” and adjust its legislation to the requirements of the European community. In contrast, while President Mario Soares was the main architect of the “turn to Europe,” he nonetheless took into account Portugal’s former positioning in the Atlantic and, thus, its imperial continuities. His speeches about the Portuguese nation, pointing to “Portugal modernity” and the “need of preparation to the third millenium,” have recurrently recreated nineteenth century colonial imageries, such as Portugal’s “historical mission,” “universal culture and vocation,” and strategic geopolitical location. In 1986, a period characterized by sharp political cleavages between those favoring either the “Atlantic project” or the turn to Europe, Soares justified the latter as the need and desire to restore Portugal’s role in the World, in virtue of the prevailing historical circumstances at the ending of the “Empire cycle.” It is not legitimate to interpret it as a self-withdrawal to the continental European dimension, nor as a retreat from a position of openness toward the world (Soares 1987: 135).

In fact, it had been crucial for President Soares, both within the European community and with his opponents in Portugal, to emphasize the relevance of Portugal’s redefined relations with the former colonies for, according to him:
An audacious policy of cooperation with the African countries - particularly with those that speak our language - is not only feasible but also rather complementary to Portugal's European integration. This is equally valid with respect to the intensification of economic relations with Brazil. In these regards, many foolishly saw the question solely in dichotomous terms - either Africa or Europe. Imagine how risky it would have been if Portugal had not chosen the European option (1987:136).

Therefore, it was not surprising that at Lisbon´s event “Against Racism and Discrimination,” he advised the Portuguese, in particular the youth, to “act fraternally to the African, Latin-American and Asian brothers.” Later, he clarified his position to the press, stating, “The communitarian norms and directives should be respected. Yet Portugal has the duty of humanizing those directives by giving special attention to the Portuguese speaking citizens” (Folha de São Paulo 1993f).

Portuguese and Brazilians present at the event “Against Racism,” made extensive use of the Luso-Brazilian brotherhood rhetoric in their interviews with the press. The latent contradictions between the existing responsibilities towards Europe and the existing responsibilities towards the nations of “Portuguese Official Expression” were exposed. In this respect, Portuguese intellectuals mentioned that, especially in the case of Brazil, “500 hundred years of historical vocation could not be destroyed by (Portugal’s) obligations towards Europe” (Folha de São Paulo 1993d). Brazilian Ambassador José Aparecido stressed the bonds of descent between Portugal and Brazil, indeed questioning Portuguese border-control with respect to the entry of Brazilians to Portugal, stating, “The image created in 500
years of relationships cannot be administered by the Foreigners and Borders Service at the Portela Airport even *because Brazilians are not foreigners in Portugal* (Folha de São Paulo 1993d).

By calling attention to the common “historical roots” between Portugal and Brazil, the Ambassador superimposed Portugal’s more ambiguous cultural borders over the nation’s rigid territorial borders. He challenged the construction of Brazilians as foreign “others,” claiming sameness between Portuguese and Brazilians on the basis of both culture and the 1972 Bilateral Treaty established between Brazil and Portugal. In similar ways, the varied self-identifications of Brazilians in Portugal reflect the ambiguities resultant from the constant production of sameness as well as immigrants’ transnational networks of kinship and marriage between Brazil and Portugal. Moreover, given these transnational bonds, the granting of dual citizenship and nationality rights by the Portuguese post-colonial state to the Portuguese spread across the world, based upon a broad definition of kinship and descent, blurred even further the cultural borders between the two countries. Thus, to express oneself as the “same” or as the foreign “other,” to consider oneself an “immigrant,” a “resident with equal rights,” a “Luso-Brazilian,” “Portuguese-Brazilian,” a “Portuguese with a Brazilian soul,” or a “militant Luso-Brazilian,” becomes a question of positioning and social location.

These constructed self-identifications continued the ambiguous differentiation between “Portuguese” and “Brazilians” during the Brazilian Independence in 1822, as well as subsequently between Portuguese businessmen and Portuguese immigrants in Brazil (Ribeiro 1999). In comparison, in the United States, where the Portuguese are more distant from the arenas of dominant political and economic power, the category “immigrant” rigidly differentiates Americans from non-Americans. Thus, instead of imposing categories (such as that of immigrant), it becomes essential to analyze the
representations and self-representations of sameness and difference in specific contexts and situations, including the possibilities of negotiations and maneuverings those representations and self-representations present.

Perhaps because of the broad range of self-identifications and national locations open to Brazilian immigrants in Portugal, only one self-proclaimed Brazilian immigrant association in Portugal has developed, the Casa do Brasil de Lisboa (Lisbon’s House of Brazil). A leading protagonist on behalf of immigrants rights, this association was formed in 1992 by Brazilians, Portuguese who had lived in Brazil and their Luso-Brazilian descendants, some of whom were formerly political exiles with influential transnational networks. Its founding members met in Lisbon in 1989 where they all were active in Brazilian politics, campaigning in support of Lula, the Workers Party candidate for the Presidency of Brazilian Republic. They worked in 1992 for the impeachment of (then) Brazilian President Fernando Collor. In that year, they joined together with a handful of Portuguese speaking African immigrant associations in the defense of “non-communitarian” immigrants’ rights. Arguing that “for historical and cultural reasons, the lusophone community was entitled to distinctive treatment and that European integration could not be done at the cost of denying those bonds,” they quickly mobilized to protest against the ongoing deportations (Santos 1999).

On January 29, 1993, in the presence of Brazilian press correspondents and representatives of other Portuguese speaking immigrant associations, the Lisbon’s House of Brazil leadership held a debate on the new Foreign Law. For the occasion, the association had prepared a special issue of their newspaper, Sabiá, about the “concessions” granted by the Brazilian government to Portuguese immigrants (Jornal do Brasil 1993a). This suggested that the 1972 Equal Rights Treaty had fueled their
political mobilization. In an interview, a principal leader of the association claimed, “the fact the Portuguese had benefited from the treaty in Brazil, warrants the Brazilians the rights to the same advantages.” Brazilian entitlement to the same rights, based upon the bilateral negotiations, was also recognized by leaders of immigrant associations of Angola and Cape Verde, who supported the actions taken by the Brazilian diplomat.

During the event, Virginia de Freitas, then president of the House of Brazil commenting on the Brazilians’ reactions to the restrictive Foreign Law, stated, “We are afraid, I have equal rights, and I am afraid. We don’t feel at home anymore [in Portugal]” (Jornal do Brasil a) At that time, Virginia was married to Alípio de Freitas. An active bicultural Portuguese leader of the association, Alípio de Freitas, who had became well-known in Brazil because of his activism in the Brazilian Peasant Leagues of the 1950’s and 1960’s, is also a long time friend of Brazilian Ambassador José Aparecido.

Fear, insecurity, the sense of “not feeling at home anymore” and, thus, of increasing foreignness and strangeness, were responses to some of the law’s provisions. The association was especially concerned with the possibility of the immediate deportation of illegal immigrants, as well as the expatriation of legal immigrants whose acts were seen as an attempt against national security, the public order or the good customs (Santos 1999). In view of such repressive policies, which copied Schegen’s earlier provisions, the House of Brazil advised immigrants, and particularly the blacks, “to always carry your residence authorization. If detained by the police, don’t run away; answer their questions in a polite manner; those of the black race should be particularly careful” (Jornal do Brasil 1993a).

At the meeting, José Leitão, a leading figure in the mobilization of lusophone immigrant associations, at that time a Congressman of the Socialist Party, and today the High Commissar of
Immigration, expressed solidarity with the Brazilians. Ironically referring to the intended creation of “centers of temporary shelter for immigrants awaiting expulsion,” he stated that “in civilized Europe, new racist and xenophobic feelings [pervade] the Portugal of the Economic Community” (Jornal do Brasil 1993a).

Just a few days later, after two more Brazilians were forbidden to enter Portugal, the Brazilian press featured a “Demonstration of approximately 100 people among Brazilians, Portuguese and Immigrants of other Portuguese former colonies in front of the Brazilian Consulate in Lisbon” (Folha de São Paulo 1993 h). This protest was part of the increasing mobilization of Portuguese speaking immigrants associations, who, since 1991, had demanded differential treatment and the right to remain in Portugal. Allied to segments of the Portuguese Socialist Party and the Catholic Church, these associations objected to Prime Minister CavacoSilva’s policies and at the same time endorsed President Mario Soares’ statements that Portugal’s duty was “to humanize the rules and render special treatment to Portuguese speaking citizens” (Folha de São Paulo 1993 h).

The mobilization of immigrants had been initiated by a handful of Portuguese Africa associations. At first, they demanded mainly educational policies and housing reallocation to assist needy Portuguese-speaking African immigrants. Yet in 1992, when the House of Brazil joined the other associations, the most active immigrant associations, in alliance with Socialist Party members and the Catholic Church, were already planning a Coordinating Secretariat of Associations for Legalization (SCAL). While there were sharp differences between the different colonial histories of the immigrant populations and the Brazilians had higher socioeconomic and educational patterns than the Africans, the mobilization for immigrants’ rights united them. By that time, their goal was to obtain a successful “extraordinary
regularization” process through which illegal immigrants could apply to legal status. Such a process had been already scheduled by the Ministry of Internal Administration in anticipation to the incoming Foreign Law tightening the control on the entry, departure, permanence, and eviction of foreigners.

In the context of those struggles, the associations progressively shifted their self-identification from a movement of “non-communitarian citizens” to a “movement without borders.” This motto, initially suggested to SCAL by the Lisbon’s House of Brazil leadership, was inspired by their conversations with philosopher and humanist Agostinho da Silva, a bicultural Portuguese who spent many years in Brazil. Reinterpreting poet Pessoa’s metaphor my fatherland is my language, he commented on the post-colonial era that

From the rectangle of Europe, we [Portugal] became something totally different. Now Portugal is the entire Portuguese language territory. The Brazilians may call it Brazil and the Mozambicans may call it Mozambique. It is an extended fatherland, that one, which Fernando Pessoa thought it, was his fatherland: the Portuguese Language. Now this language is the fatherland of all of us (Medanha 1994: 30-31).

Influenced by this expansionist vision on Portugal, the “movement without borders” invoked a shared Portuguese language to reinforce the cultural sameness between former colonizers and colonized. It attempted to dissolve the contradictions and incompatibilities inherent in the process of changing the former metropolis into a European post-colonial nation. This strategy is extremely significant insofar as the movement employed the same metaphor used by governmental officials with regards to the creation
of a Portuguese post-colonial nation based on population, rather than territory. By resorting to the
Portuguese language as a metaphor of the “bonds of blood” (and thus of common descent) the
“Movement Without Borders” began to demand rights to the common historical roots without ever
referring to any colonial debts or exploitation. No mention was made of the fact that the Portuguese
language is also the basis for the production of significant differences between Portuguese and Brazilians.
Paradoxically, the reconfiguration of the empire was a strategy pursued by ex-colonial subjects to
enable them to remain in Portugal and, thus, to circulate freely within the European supranational space.
But, as we will see, those strategies, while favoring the assertion of a national project designed to
reconcile the tensions between a European and Atlantic base for Portugal, at the same time revealed the
limits of this politics of sameness.

From another social location, the Fundação Luso-Brasileira (Luso-Brazilian Foundation), a
Portuguese private institution created in Lisbon in 1992, also took a stand on the ongoing
confrontations. Like the House of Brazil, the Luso-Brazilian Foundation unites Brazilians with
Portuguese from Brazil, now living in Portugal, including former exiles. Yet the goals of the two
organizations differ. The Luso-Brazilian Foundation promotes the Portuguese language and the politics
of [high] culture as part of the development of markets and investments. It seeks to reconfigure the
Luso-Brazilian community, based upon appropriation of the Freyrian vision of “Brazil as the Future of
Portugal.” Together with the Club of Brazil’s entrepreneurs (formed in 1989) and the Brazilian Council
of Commerce in Lisbon (formed in the 1940’s and reactivated in the late 1980’s), the Luso-Brazilian
foundation represents entrepreneurial assets. In the 1980’s and early 1990’s, these associations
represented Brazil’s entrepreneurs and investors interested in expanding their European and
Lusophonen markets. In the later part of the 1990’s, they shifted their activities to assist the interests of Portugal in Brazil. Therefore, it was not by chance that, at the time of the conflicts, the foundation’s administrator pointed out “the importance of separating business from the immigration problem.” Nonetheless, he claimed that, since Brazilian companies had already invested a billion dollars and directly created 8,200 jobs in Portugal between 1990 and 1992, the treatment by customs officers of the detained Brazilians could have negative results for the Portuguese (Globo 1993 f). It is interesting to note that those statements were made just as the Brazilian government began reprisals against Portugal’s rupture of the equal rights treaty.

The so-called retaliations were announced in such headlines as [President] “Itamar abolishes privileges of the Portuguese” and “Itamaraty [a Brazilian Diplomat] studies ways out of the crisis” (Globo 1993b). The Portuguese government was denounced for breaking the bilateral treaty of friendship and equal rights that accorded reciprocal rights to Brazilian and Portuguese citizens. In a derogatory allusion to the Brazilians’ prevailing comic image of the Portuguese as ignorant, rude, and who wear clogs instead of shoes, the press announced a Brazilian Federal Police “Clog Action,” aimed at rigorous searches of Portuguese citizen’s luggage by the Brazilian customs (Globo 1993c). As a result, Portuguese tourists were detained at Brazilian airports and a flamboyant arrest was made of a student carrying cocaine.

In view of Brazil’s threats to review the existing bilateral treaties between Brazil and Portugal, the President of the Federation of Portuguese and Luso-Brazilian Associations of Rio de Janeiro came out in defense of the so-called “Luso-Brazilian Community.” He enumerated the difficulties the Portuguese traditionally confronted in Brazil in an article entitled “Testimony of a Portuguese in Brazil”
The list included problems with the concession of visas, equivalency of diplomas, access to public jobs, taxation of capital, and lack of social security. All these problems resemble the uncertainties Brazilians confront today in Portugal. In similar manner, the Portuguese immigrant press in Brazil began to publish articles and letters reporting the variety of problems the Portuguese had confronted in Brazil, dismissing the idyllic impression of the so-called Portuguese’s special rights and privileges. In fact, as Manuela de Aguiar (1999) has pointed out, the political mobilizations of Portuguese immigrants helped them win those rights, and in the 1960’s led to a bilateral treaty between Brazil and Portugal.

But, the “retaliations” apparently were a successful stratagem. By February 7, 1993, the Brazilian press announced that the “Chancellors of Brazil and Portugal are already trying to reach an agreement.” (Globo 1993g). The Globo reported that ambassador José Aparecido “travels to Brazil at the request of President Itamar Franco” and “brings a friendly message.” President and Prime Minister of Portugal were both said to be eager to “reestablish the fraternal conviviality between Brazilians and Portuguese” (Globo 1993 e).

Ambassador José Aparecido was portrayed by the Brazilian media as the main architect in the reopening of diplomatic channels between Brazil and Portugal. He was highly praised by his ability to shift the discussions about the deported Brazilians from Portugal’s Ministry of Internal Administration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the context of meetings that aimed at “avoiding the entrance of criminals, prostitutes and transvestites in Portugal” (Jornal do Brasil 1993b). Norma Coury, the Jornal do Brasil correspondent, in an article dated February 8, 1993, emphasized the Ambassador’s success in recovering Brazil’s self-respect. According to her, with his motto “The celebration of the 500 years
of the discovery [of Brazil] cannot be administered from the Portela Airport,” the Ambassador shifted the Portuguese government’s attention from Europe to the Americas” (Coury 1993).

As part of the “reconciliation” process, the Portuguese chancellor stated that the “Incidents with Brazilians in Lisbon should not affect the relations between Brazil and Portugal,” further suggesting the creation of a Brazilian governmental committee to “examine Portuguese officials procedures regarding the arrival of Brazilians in Lisbon” (Globo 1993h).

The reconciliation process between Brazil and Portugal was still ongoing on February 20, 1993, as the two countries collaborated within a bilateral committee on the discoveries. The press commented, “The nomination of Brazil’s first representative to the bilateral committee in charge of promoting the celebrations of Pedro Álvares Cabral’s 500 year voyage of discovery was seen as a sign of good will” (Garcia 1993).

As the crisis evolved, Jornal do Brasil’s well-known political columnist, Castello Branco, attempted to offer an objective analysis on the diplomatic conflicts between Brazil and Portugal. According to him, in so far as Portugal’s adjustment to the European Community’s norms and pressures broke “a tradition of cordial, friendly conviviality between the two countries,” the problems highlighted by the conflicts became emotional and difficult (Branco 1993). While noting that the Brazilian government had to protest against what could be seen as “an obstacle of adaptation to Portugal’s new style of relationships with the world,” he also pointed out that “This new style is connected to the problematical question of access to the European Community as well as to the fact that Portugal became a country of immigration and Brazil turned into an exporter of female and male prostitutes as well as a channel of drug traffic” (Branco 1993).
Yet, the sequence of events suggests that the diplomatic conflicts between Portugal and Brazil were accommodated through reference to shared historical roots. Therefore, it was not surprising at all that in 1993 after the so-called “reconciliation” was accomplished, Brazilian Ambassador José Aparecido launched his “cherished” project: the supranational Community of Portuguese Language Countries, the CPLP. According to his testimony, this project had originated in Brazil in 1962 during the short presidency of Jânio Quadros under the inspiration and influence of philosopher and humanist Agostinho da Silva. Yet, most probably his motto “Brazil as a continuation of Portugal,” or “Brazil as the future of Portugal” was also influenced by the lusotropicalism of Gilberto Freyre who wrote “Our Pan-Luzitan sense. . . is sustained by the best humanism without however dissolving itself into vague and dangerous cosmopolitisms. Therefore, there is a need to empower ourselves: all the Portuguese and Portuguese descendants either by blood or culture as only one people, as only one culture” (1962:14).

In addition to revealing different locations of Portugal and Brazil at a particular moment in respect to the global restructuring of capital, underneath a rhetoric of blood and brotherhood, this social drama highlighted the roles of the Brazilian and Luso-Brazilian association’s bicultural leaders as brokers in the reconfiguration of the Portuguese empire. Reuniting Portuguese and Brazilian citizens, those associations have endeavored to affirm an emerging “Lusophone world,” from diverse social locations and vested interests. Thus, the Luso-Brazilian Foundation for the Promotion of the Portuguese Language, together with the Luso-Brazilian Council of Commerce and the Brazil’s Entrepreneurs Club, combined the politics of culture with their marketing and investments interests, to broadening their presence in the Lusophone and European markets. Comparatively, Lisbon’s House of Brazil, along with the Portuguese-speaking African-immigrant associations, endeavored to have rights to lusophone roots.
recognized as a way of enabling Portuguese-speaking immigrants to remain in Portugal and, thus, circulate within the “fortress of Europe.”

As an outcome of the political mobilization in favor of the lusophone immigrants’ rights, the House of Brazil, together with the most active Portuguese-speaking African-immigrant associations, were called to participate in an Immigrant Communities and Ethnic Minorities Consultative Council at the Lisbon City Council. Aiming, to assure at the local level, “the participation of the communities in the very process directed to their integration in society,” the City Council led then by socialist Jorge Sampaio—now the President of Portugal—began to emphasize minority rights, the respect for cultural identity, intercultural dialogues, and multiculturalism. Thus, in a period of intense political polarization, by way of emblems of “democratic Europe,” this consultative council was transformed in a location of contestation. It challenged Cavaco Silva’s policies that were most often viewed by his opposition as instigating racism and xenophobia.

After the victory of the Socialist Party in the 1996 national elections and the creation of a High Commissariat of Immigrant Communities and Ethnic Minorities, some of the immigrant leadership demands were acknowledged. Governmental officials and immigrant leaders worked jointly in the organization of a second and more successful “extraordinary regularization process.” The first “extraordinary regularization process was conducted in 1992 and the second in 1996, just after President Sampaio began his incumbency.

As the status of many illegal immigrants was regularized, they were granted the right to vote at the local level. But in view of the existing alliances between the Socialist Party and the Portuguese-speaking immigrant leaders (some of whom became members of that party), and the continued
subjection of the Portuguese post-colonial state to the norms of European Union, the lusophone
movement lost strength. Meanwhile, in addition to the growing Portuguese-speaking immigrants,
increasing numbers of East European and non-Portuguese African citizens had illegally settled in
Portugal. In response, the Socialist government, like its predecessors, continued to emphasize its
unbending control over territorial borders. In the year 2000, it responded to the ongoing demands for
workers by promulgating a new and more rigid decree, through which the entry of immigrant laborers
into Portugal has been allowed only on the basis of temporary work contracts.

Yet, since 1996, as the Socialist government recreated a lusophone ideology, European
multicultural policies were redefined in the light of Gilberto Freyre’s Lusotropicalism. By implicitly
referring to plasticity and, by extension to Portuguese “positive miscegenation,” the official state
propaganda, mostly directed to the Portuguese-speaking immigrants of Africa, has once more reiterated
the sameness and has therefore insisted on a supposed non-differentiation between former colonizer and
colonized. In this way, the Portuguese state has attempted to dissolve the continuous production of
categories and hierarchies of difference in relation to the lusophone immigrant population.19

While the socialist government’s officers have included an Atlantic expansionist perspective and
lusotropicalism in their discourses and practices, the differential treatment of the populations arriving
from Portugal’s former colonies has continued to be subjected to the European Union’s policies.
Governmental authorities have sought the “harmonious integration” of immigrants in Portuguese society,
but only of those legal immigrants who are already settled in Portugal, the majority of whom came from
Portuguese-speaking countries. Moreover, insofar as governmental officials have directed their policies
towards the immigrant populations from the Portuguese speaking nations of Africa, the social distance
between the *House of Brazil* and the other Portuguese speaking immigrant associations, including their differing demands on the Portuguese government, came to the fore. Although continuing to participate in campaigns against racism and xenophobia, the House of Brazil’s leaders have tended to mobilize predominantly around issues concerning Brazil and Brazilian immigrants.

*(End of the First Act)*

*Intermission*


*The setting: Act takes place in the late 1990’s in between Brazil and Portugal*

*Key protagonists are Portugal’s governmental officials, Portuguese enterprises and investments; and the leading citizens of the Portuguese and Luso-Brazilian associations of São Paulo, in particular the House of Portugal of São Paulo (a confederation of immigrant associations) the 25 of April Cultural Center, the Portuguese Council of Commerce of São Paulo.*

*The curtain rises again*
On June 10, 1999, the Day of Portugal, Camões and the Portuguese Communities, Portugal’s Ambassador in Brazil, Francisco Knopfl, discussed the strong affectionate bonds between Brazil and Portugal in the present era of economic globalization in the op-ed page of a major São Paulo’s newspaper.

Portugal and Brazil have extended and strengthened throughout the centuries a strong affectionate relation. It is rare to find, either in Brazil or in Portugal, someone who does not have a kinship relation on each side of the Atlantic. In addition to those sentimental ties, Portugal understood how to deepen the cultural and economic relations. . . Portuguese entrepreneurs have real and concrete interests in Brazil’s economic potentialities. . .

Today, as in past times, Luso-Brazilian relations are not restricted to economics. Through their very existence, both the Portuguese Community resident in Brazil and the Brazilian community resident in Portugal give body and form to the bonds and affinities that have united both countries. Thereby, they have helped carry forward to the future a solid, coherent and crucial amplification of those relations- whether at the bilateral level, whether at the [supranational] CPLP—Community of Portuguese Language Countries and whether still in the wider space of the European Union-Mercosul inter-regional cooperation.

In this wide and problematic international context, which is itself contradictory, Portugal and Brazil will only benefit from strengthening their relations, in favor of a better positioning in the [next] millenium. They could base their relationships upon an acknowledgment of the rich and
extensive common patrimony they have shared for almost 500 years, pursuing the historical evolution which is today more rapid than in the past. Developing relations upon those directions and at the same time assuring high cooperation and friendship values will constitute a warranty of prospective success for both Brazil and Portugal (Knopfli 1999).

In some way, these statements comprise a summary of the ways current Portuguese officials have negotiated Portugal’s position in the global political economy. At first, upon the dissolution of the empire and the redesign of the Portuguese nation in 1981, emigrants who have retained their Portuguese nationality, along with their descendents, were granted dual nationality and citizenship rights. At the same time, by recognizing that “emigrants have kept a complex network of relationships,” the central government sought to increase and intensify the active participation of this diaspora in every sector of Portuguese society (Aguiar 1986). Toward that end, in 1980, it created a State Division of Portuguese Communities in charge of providing support to the Portuguese-dispersed populations and reinforcing their linkages with the home country. Concomitantly, the government began channeling information that could attract emigrants to invest their resources at home and, in addition, established a system of support and benefits for those interested in resettling in Portugal. Governmental authorities have begun to encourage leading citizens of the Portuguese diaspora “to represent Portugal in the world.”

Meanwhile, Portuguese authorities redefined their relationships with Brazil, as well as with Portugal’s former overseas dominions of Africa. Yet beginning in 1996, the incumbent socialist government increasingly capitalized on the reconfiguration of the former Portuguese empire, now transmuted into a “Lusophone” or Portuguese-speaking supranational community. Based upon both the
inclusion of Portuguese emigrants into the nation and its redefined relations with former colonies, 

Portuguese officials and intellectuals have reinvented Portugal’s “Atlantic and universal vocation” and Portuguese culture as a way of reconstructing its earlier role as a broker in the global economy. In the course of this imperial reconstitution, Brazil - considered Portugal’s “major creation” – has been once again designated, however ambivalently, as a partner.

As suggested by the Ambassador, the type of economic relations that exist between Portugal and Brazil are not novel. Vested interests in commerce, together with Portuguese emigration to Brazil, can be traced to the colonial period. Competition between capitalists from Brazil and capitalists from Portugal was exacerbated particularly after Brazil became the seat of the Empire in 1808 (Fragoso 1992; Ribeiro 1999, Rowland 1998). The reversal of economic and political positions between colony and metropolis eventually led to Brazilian independence. And even in the Brazilian post-independence era, commerce with, and emigration to, Brazil had remained an important asset for the decadent Portuguese empire. As Nelson Vieira (1991) has indicated, leading Portuguese intellectuals

... favored increasing Portuguese emigration to Brazil since, besides commerce with Brazil, Portugal depended on the revenues coming from the “Brazilian” Portuguese who have returned to their fatherland. ... It was, therefore, profitable and advantageous for Portugal to build up the bonds of friendship with Brazil. On the other hand, it should be noticed that such bonds were relegated to commerce and predominantly to the relations between Portuguese emigrants and the Brazilians.
Portuguese emigrants in Brazil are part of a global Portuguese diaspora that had a complex relationship to the Portuguese colonial state. Although the former Portuguese colonial state considered its emigrants as “second” and “third” rate citizens, emigrants remittances, together with the “market of nostalgia,” were for more than a century the main sources of Portugal’s revenues. In fact, until quite recently, Portuguese exports to Brazil were virtually limited to the consumption demands of Portuguese families. In contrast, presently, as a spokesperson of the Portuguese embassy in Brazil proudly announces “Portugal exports capital. In the last four years, the acquisitions made by Portuguese groups in Brazil totaled 11 billions of dollars. Portugal is turning even more to foreign [markets] and from now on Brazil is the number one priority.”(Iacomini 1999; Lima 1999)

While in the 1980’s, enterprises and investments from Brazil were heading towards Portugal, a dramatic shift began in the mid-1990’s. Portuguese enterprises and investments have landed increasingly in the Brazilian national markets.

Brazilian historian Luis Felipe Alencastro has pointed out correctly the need to analyze these new Atlantic crossings against the background of a new phase of Iberian geopolitics (Alencastro 1999: 21). The Portuguese Ministry of Economy’s Office of Investments, Commerce and Tourism and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Camões Institute for the advancement of Portuguese language and culture played key roles in this new phase, which should be seen as part of Portuguese state’s efforts to enhance Portugal’s “modernity.” Whereas the New State dictatorship had created in the 1950’s a Portuguese Economic Community to confront the emerging European common market (Alexandre 1998), the contemporary post-colonial state, positioned within the bounded space of the European
Union, has turned once again to its former colonies, especially to Brazil. Through combined actions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture and Economy, Portugal’s socialist government has increasingly invested in new technologies. In this way, it has built a solid information industry tying the promotion of the Portuguese cultural patrimony to the ongoing politics of expansion in markets, tourism, and investments. Given this aim, the incumbent post-colonial government has deemed it crucial to recreate the similarities of culture and language binding together Brazil and Portugal in the consolidation of a supranational lusophone block under Portugal’s leadership. This supranational block includes also the African nations of Portuguese official expression.

These re-creations have been built on old conceptualizations that date back to the era of maritime explorations and that highlight Portugal’s “Atlantic vocation” as though it were a special Portuguese trait. As part of this endeavor, the Portuguese post-colonial state has increasingly marketed its maritime past through symposiums, publications, and exhibits promoted by a National Commission for the Commemoration of the Portuguese Discoveries as well as by the Camões Institute.

In the early 1990’s, when Brazilian diplomacy was interested in building the supranational lusophone “community of feeling,” the incumbent Brazilian Ambassador in Portugal often resorted to Gilberto Freyre’s motto “Brazil, future of Portugal” as a way of representing Brazil as Portugal’s heir. Nowadays, however, the adequate meaning of that metaphor seems to be the future of Portugal is in Brazil [as a major market] for Portuguese entrepreneurs and investors.

In the context of ongoing changes, in a historical juncture signaled by a steady diminishing of Portuguese emigration to Brazil, continuities between the past and the present began to be built through the celebrations of old generations of successful immigrants. Once again, as in the New State era,
prosperous immigrants are being praised as “heroic entrepreneurs” and compared to the ancestral “heroes of the sea.” These continuities have been written into a linear history. The successful immigrants of the past have been linked to today’s Portuguese economic groups operating in Brazil:

Between 1930 and the 1960’s many [Portuguese] headed to Brazil where they began businesses that have turned into strong economic groups. This is the case of *Pão de Açúcar* founded by Valentim dos Santos Diniz that is today the country’s second largest supermarket network. We also could mention *Lusitana*, Maranhão State’s major supermarket chain, or still the Votorantim Group - a major Brazilian industrial conglomerate that formed by the Portuguese José Erminio de Morais. This is why this interest in Brazil assumes the character of return. In 1994 the Portuguese direct investment in Brazil did not exceed 3 million dollars. In the following year 33 million dollars and, in 1996, Portugal invested in Brazil 230 million dollars. A real record is expected for this current year and the enthusiasm of the entrepreneurial missions arriving from the other side of the Atlantic is each time greater. Well, with a market of the size of a continent! (Exame 1997).

As opposed to past policies in which recurring debates in Portugal questioned whether emigration was a source of progress or backwardness, post-colonial Portuguese authorities have tried to capitalize on the inclusion of dispersed Portuguese into the nation. In this regard, it should be noted that emigrants´ remittances still make up 30% of the Portuguese economy (E. Silva 2000). At the same time, however, they have continued to focus primarily on Portuguese associations as their main bases of support in the diaspora. The associations abroad have been encouraged to sponsor programs that
strengthen the persistence of Portuguese culture and language in the world and reinforce the economic, social, and cultural cooperation among Portuguese abroad, as well as between the dispersed populations of the Portuguese diaspora and the regions of Portugal they came from. To implement these Portuguese policies a worldwide consultative Council of Portuguese Communities was created in 1980, comprised of representatives of leading Portuguese diasporic associations from different parts of the globe. Moreover, at least since Schegen, Portuguese governmental officers have increasingly invested in promoting Portuguese high culture and, at the same time, they have denied the existence of continuing emigration from Portugal. This denial is based on ambiguities. First, as the diasporic Portuguese were included into the nation, the term “emigrant” was replaced by the expressions “Portuguese abroad” and “Portuguese spread across the world.” Second, given the fact that most Portuguese have, since the sixties, emigrated to European countries that are part of the European Union, they are not formally immigrants, even though they still leave Portugal to work elsewhere.

Governmental polices have focused on the affluent and influential among the diaspora who are seen as bases for the promotion of an image of Portugal as a modern “European (central) nation,” as well as brokers between governmental representatives and commercial missions. Therefore, the motto, “Portuguese abroad have the responsibility to represent Portugal in the world and to integrate themselves without assimilation in the receiving countries” (Aguiar 1986) applies remarkably well to affluent and influential Portuguese throughout the diaspora. In the project of establishing a global Portuguese nation-state, the leading citizens of nationally—rather than regionally-oriented associations became the main interlocutors of Portugal. In São Paulo, the Casa de Portugal de São Paulo (São Paulo’s House of Portugal) certainly occupies a distinguished place. Formed in
1935 in a period when Salazarists were creating “Houses of Portugal” as bases of support in different countries for the New State dictatorship, the São Paulo House of Portugal became a contested domain between the Republicans who had escaped to Brazil after the 1926 coup d’état and Salazar backers. The Republicans apparently won the battle, at first. The São Paulo House of Portugal was modeled upon a proposal by engineer Ricardo Severo, a Republican, known as “the patriarch of the Portuguese colony.” At the time, Severo presided over the Portuguese Council of Commerce. He visualized the House of Portugal as a conglomerate of associations. Accordingly, its building also lodges the Portuguese Consulate, the old Council of the Luzo-Brazilian Communities, the Portuguese Council of Commerce, the Luziada Academy of Sciences, Letters and Arts, and the more recently formed Camões Institute, all of them representing aspects of Portugueseness. And the committee directing the House of Portugal has continued to be composed of presidents of many Portuguese associations, mostly successful businessmen and professionals. They are part of São Paulo’s dominant classes and, at the same time, maintain houses and business investments in Portugal.

Since most of its leading members settled in Brazil in the 1950’s and are old timers in the associations’ politics, the Casa de Portugal have for a long time served as a broker for the Portuguese State in São Paulo. As a result of their activities, the Casa de Portugal’s influential members have gained commendations from the Portuguese State and were awarded the title of comendador, literally commend holders. Thus, independently of their political positions, these leading citizens, who represent a wide spectrum of political tendencies and are affiliated with different Portuguese political parties, continued to be summoned to help post-colonial Portugal. In the 1990’s, their task was to transform the prevailing backward image of Portugal into one of a modern European nation.
By the late 1990’s, along with increasing emphasis on the politics of high culture and the massive entry of Portuguese enterprises and investments in Brazil, the incumbent socialist government in Portugal revived competition by re-establishing the World Council of the Portuguese Communities and changing the selection procedures of its board. The council’s board was to be composed of 100 representatives of the dispersed Portuguese population across the world. The number of representatives of each country was to be calculated proportionally to the total number of Portuguese settled in each country. Since Brazil still lodges the largest contingent of Portuguese and descendents, they have been entitled to a larger share of seats in that council—25—while the Portuguese of France, for instance, were allocated 10 seats. The implementation in 1997 of direct elections ultimately guaranteed a broader representation of political tendencies and helped renew the diverse constructions of Portuogeuseess among leading citizens in the diaspora. Yet, it remained limited to a very small segment of the Portuguese emigrant population, since while there were 110,000 registered Portuguese in São Paulo’s Consulate of Portugal, only 2,698 voted in the elections, or less than three percent. These numbers include immigrants and descendents who hold Portuguese nationality.

The electoral campaign highlighted the increasing disputes among the so-called comendadores, as well as between the comendadores and the self-entitled independentes (independents). The independents assembled citizens who were affiliated to the 25 of April Cultural Center—mostly old activists who had fought against Salazarism and colonialism—representatives of other Portuguese and Luso-Brazilian associations of diverse political tendencies, and members of a recently formed Portuguese Youth Movement. All of these organizations had links to the House of Portugal. While heterogeneous in its composition, the so-called independents were united in their opposition to the small
group of better-off *comendadores*, who have long led the main Portuguese associations of São Paulo and had acted publicly as the official institutional representatives of the community. Advocating a change in the leadership structure as a way of broadening the practice of democracy, the independents denounced the *comendadores* for deliberately limiting access to positions of power as well as for monopolizing the relations with the Portuguese government. *Comendadores* were accused of speaking for all Portuguese in São Paulo without holding a plebiscite or consulting with the community. In response, the *comendadores* criticized the opposition, pointing out the danger of turning individuals without any ties to the Portuguese community into legitimate leaders of the Portuguese state. Their reply was viewed by independents as an example of anti-democratic and corporate practices, associated with rotten Salazarist past.

These disputes that revived the politics of the Salazarist era intensified in the course of a series of cultural events organized by the House of Portugal to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the Portuguese “discovery of Brazil” (D. Silva 2000). Reflecting Portugal’s new prosperity, a major Portuguese bank that had recently landed in Brazil, offered the Portuguese a free House of Portugal membership for opening a bank account, and sponsored the commemorative events. The bank attempted to capitalize on a potential diasporic market. At the same time, by its promotion the events were aimed at renewing the pride of being Portuguese against the background of Portugal’s transformation into a new, modern and prosperous nation fully integrated into the European Union. Thus, the leading citizens of the House of Portugal were once again re-creating the Portuguese image as “discoverers” of the world. Among other activities, they promoted a public “Mass of the Discoveries” led by two popular priests, who are also singers, one Brazilian and the other Portuguese. The latter’s participation was highly promoted.
because of his presumed kinship ties to Pedro Álvares Cabral, the “discoverer” of Brazil. They were also reconstructing their cultural differences for the Brazilians, countervailing the continual stereotyping jokes through which Brazilians distinguish themselves from the Portuguese. But their calendar of celebrations was strongly criticized by opponents, especially those within the 25 of April Cultural Center, who have dedicated their lives to the struggles against Salazar.

During the New State dictatorship, those elderly political activists had ceaselessly denounced the prevailing exaltation of Portugal’s New World discoveries, and of Portugal’s role as a colonizer. Activists also criticized the conservative traditionalism of Portuguese folklore. Douglas Mansur da Silva (2000) has extensively analyzed their opposition to the New State regime. Presently, in view of the increasing politics of high culture and the possibility of obtaining governmental grants, Portuguese national culture has become a contested domain. In view of their long involvement in cultural activities during the dictatorship - when political obscurantism, censorship, and repression limited cultural expression, these activists saw themselves as the legitimate producers of Portuguese culture in Brazil and, as such, the privileged mediators between Portugal and Brazilian society. Reaffirming their social position as anti-salazarists, they critically examined the Portuguese presence in Brazil, both in their roles as colonizers and as economic or political immigrants. In the context of this reevaluation, they have been especially interested in highlighting the century-long contributions of the Portuguese intellectuals exiled in Brazil, in the arts, sciences, humanities, and technology, “not as colonizers, but rather as a result of cultural exchanges between Brazilians and Portuguese” (D. Silva 1999, 2000).

Their contentions about whom should represent Portugal and Portuguese national culture, and what kind of nationalistic ideology should be represented, can be examined in the context of the revival

Opposing that symbolic day because of its emphasis on the celebrations of the discoveries and the “civilization” and the “evangelizing” character of “Portuguese colonization, the 25 of April Cultural Center began in that same year plans to institute the Day of the Diaspora. According to the (1998), Day of the Diaspora represents a contra-hegemonic culture, highlighting the role of the exiled Portuguese intellectuals in Brazil.

The Day of the Diaspora aims at emphasizing forced migration . . . instead of the reputed a-historical “cultural traits” that portray the Portuguese as having an “entrepreneurial soul.” The intent is to make clear that the Community of the Portuguese Spread across the World is not only made up of heroic explorers and cultural miscigenators - but also of people who immigrated because of [specific historical] contingencies. In this century, contingencies forced the exile of workers, artists and intellectuals [who were] responsible for an important part of the Portuguese [high] culture of the period. The Day of the Diaspora represents such critical examination (D.Silva 1998).

While the leading citizens of the 25 of April Cultural Center gained access to seats in the worldwide Portuguese community council board and have recently started to market their nationalistic ideology, they have done so as a way of continuing to challenge the instituted political order. Like past governmental authorities, the incumbent Portuguese socialist government has continued to interact with the leading citizens of the major established associations in the diaspora, such as those of the House of
Portugal, whose brokerage has conformed to their ongoing political aims. The socialists have named some association leaders as official representatives in major Brazilian cultural events.

Yet, while there was a political opening, the ongoing competition among Luso-Brazilians for positions, resources, and representations within Portugal and Portuguese national culture has remained confined to a small number of the diaspora’s leading citizens. The majority of the Portuguese population of São Paulo has remained far removed from the political scene. Independently of their political positions, affluent and influential citizens have tended to consider the masses of Portuguese immigrants and descendants who do not belong to an association or do not have a prominent public role in the associative life as “invisible” (Seki 1999). In this way, they have helped exclude perhaps unintentionally the majority of Portuguese from the political arena.

*End of second act.*

**CONCLUSIONS**

In this essay, I have examined the contradictions, ambiguities, and accommodations underlying the remodeling of Portugal from an imperial metropolis to a European post-colonial nation. The focus on two different diasporic situations in-between Portugal and Brazil has enabled me to analyze two interrelated facets of these complex processes of national redefinition: the incorporation of Portuguese transnational migrants into the nation and, in this context, Portugal’s transformation into a receiver of immigrants from former colonies. The analyses of both situations revealed that the emigration and
immigration policies of the Portuguese post-colonial state are constitutive of the ways in which governmental officers have negotiated Portugal’s position in the global economy. Dramatized in two acts, these situations depict different moments of the remodeling of a nation anchored on European community norms. The first disclosed a historical conjuncture of intense ideological disputes about “what the Portuguese nation should be”; and, the second indicated that the present configuration of Portuguese nationalism increasingly intersects with the politics of investments and the marketing of Portuguese high culture.

From this broader framework, in the first act, the diplomatic conflicts between Portugal and Brazil bring to light the tensions and contradictions provoked by the institutional changes that marked the end of empire and that turned Portugal into a European post-colonial nation. Those tensions and contradictions restated and exacerbated existing cleavages among different nationalist ideologies about what the Portuguese nation should be (Fox 1990). Yet, the contests and accommodations have ultimately helped to assert the predominance of a conciliatory nationalist ideology, defended by President Mario Soares and segments of the Socialist Party, that laid stress on the incorporation of the former Atlantic project into the new European nation project. Consequently, the recreation of Portuguese national culture has rested on imperial continuities.

Brazilian diplomats along with the leading citizens of Luso-Brazilian associations actively participated in asserting Portuguese imperial continuities. According to their specific social locations and interests, these protagonists attempted to respond to the conflicts by defending immigrants’ rights in Portugal, the maintenance of the rights acquired by Portuguese in Brazil, or the movements and interests of capital. Since the interplay of ambiguous identities have provided “room to maneuver” for the
production of both sameness and otherness, the protagonists appealed to their common roots to soften
the differences between Brazil and Portugal. Invariably, the appeals of sameness have reaffirmed the
bounds of common descent, shared culture history, and especially, language. The production of cultural
sameness between the two countries marked by a kinship imbroglio (as referred to in the opening
citation of this essay) and the continuous, but mostly unsuccessful, attempts at establishing a Luso-
Brazilian unity, brought to the fore the perseverance and strengths of the Portuguese imperial phantom.

In this regard, it is worth remembering that in *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson calls
attention to the fact that in the case of Brazil, the United States, and the former colonies of Spain,
“language was not an element that differentiated them from their respective imperial metropoles” insofar as
“all were Creole states, formed and led by people who shared a common language and common
descent against whom they fought” (1983:50). In their reconstitution of the common bonds of descent
between Portugal and Brazil, Brazilians and bicultural “Portuguese from Brazil” alike sought to
superimpose the former empire over the post-colonial European nation. In this way, they have
attempted to disguise the immanent contradictions and incompatibilities between the former Portuguese
empire and the post-colonial nation. Towards this end, they resorted to Agostinho da Silva’s
expansionist perspective on post-colonial Portugal. A bicultural Portuguese from Brazil, who favored
Atlantism, Agostinho da Silva transmuted poet Fernando Pessoa’s aphorism, “the fatherland is my
language,” along with the specific historically constructed non-differentiation between Portugal and
Brazil, to encompass the entire (former) Portuguese empire. In this way, the Empire was reconstructed
in post-colonial times as a homogeneous territory of the Portuguese language, despite the diverse
histories and specific interdependencies between the former metropolis and its different colonies. Insofar
as that same metaphor was used to legitimize the inclusion of the Portuguese diaspora within the post-colonial nation, the ambivalence circumscribing the connection between nation and former empire became more accentuated.

The recreation of the Portuguese empire as a territory of Portuguese language, in a historical conjunction inscribed by the deportation of “undesirable” immigrants from the former Portuguese colonies, extended well beyond the bilateral relations between Brazil and Portugal, as well as a supposed Luso-Brazilian unity. On the one hand, this reconstruction enabled lusophone immigrant associations in Portugal to claim their rights to “common roots.” Notwithstanding Portugal’s differing imperial projects with its different colonies, and the different social locations and needs of the populations they represented, mobilization in favor of differential treatment for Portuguese-speaking immigrants united lusophone immigrant leaders around a “Movement Without Borders.” By reaffirming cultural sameness through an emphasis on common language as a bond of blood, this leadership actively invested in the production of homogeneity between former metropolis and colonies. Thereby, they actively participated in the production of imperial continuities in post-colonial Portugal. But while challenging the Portuguese European project, the imperial reconstructions paradoxically were part of the lusophone immigrants’ strategies to remain in Portugal and, thus, to circulate within the European economic regional block. Above all, the defense of Atlantism has benefited those favoring a nationalistic ideology that viewed the European project as resting upon imperial continuities.

On the other hand, the conflation of nation and former empire in the present state of global capitalism has further entangled efforts and contests around the creation of a supranational Lusophonic Community of Nations. This new supranational territory of the Portuguese language, meaningfully known
as a *Community of Feelings*, represents the new face of the Portuguese empire in times of economic globalization. Upon the accommodations of conflicts and the affirmation of cultural sameness between Brazil and Portugal, the Brazilian Ambassador in Portugal advocated the formation of such a supranational block. At that time, the Brazilian diplomatic drive gained the support of both Luso-Brazilian associations aiming at the promotion of the Portuguese language and the expansion of markets and lusophone immigrants struggling for special treatment in Portugal. However, under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Brazilian state increasingly turned attention to the formation of Mercosul, the South American regional economic block, rather than the so-called “Portuguese Speaking World.” Meanwhile, upon the victory of the Socialist Party in the 1996 central elections and the consolidation of a conciliatory national ideology, lusophony became the dominant Portuguese state ideology.

The sequential events after the Socialist Party victory in the 1996 central elections and the ensuing triumph of a national project favoring conciliation between the European and the Atlantic projects, revealed the limits of the politics of sameness. The events suggest that the lusophone immigrant leadership in Portugal unwittingly shared in the dialectics of both inclusion and exclusion. Ironically, the regularization processes of illegal transmigrants and the granting of differential treatment to Portuguese-speaking immigrants enabled incumbent governmental officers to limit inclusion to representatives of just a few lusophone immigrant associations. On this basis, Portuguese post-colonial policies, under the Socialist Party government, continued to conform to European norms. Accordingly, government officers, viewing “undesirable” transmigrants as a matter of national and supranational security, increased control over territorial borders. At the same time, human rights policies, giving special prominence to
intercultural dialogues, multiculturalism, and fights against xenophobia and racism, were directed only to those legal transmigrants who had already settled in Portugal.

It is important to note, however, that these European multicultural policies were redefined in the light of Gilberto Freyre’s notion of Lusotropicalism, an ideology first elaborated for explaining Brazilian cultural history but that, nevertheless, during late colonialism was transferred to New State relations with Portugal’s former African overseas domains. Directing its advertising campaigns mostly to the largely Lisbon-based immigrant populations of “Portuguese Africa,” the Socialist Party government now has implicitly referred to Portuguese plasticity and to positive miscegenation so as to reiterate cultural homogeneity between former colonizer and colonized. In this way, governmental officers have attempted to disguise the continuing production of racial categories and hierarchies still based on color gradations.

As a result of these governmental policies and preferential grant allocated to the needy Portuguese-speaking immigrants of Africa, the social distances and historical differences among the diasporic “brothers” came to the fore. Moreover, the mobilization of lusophone immigrants has been weakened. Given the ambiguities pervading the renewed interplay of identities between Brazil and Portugal and their search for grants, the leadership of the House of Brazil has sometimes played an accessory role in the production of lusotropicalism. Hence, references to bonds created by the Portuguese language and positive miscegenation, among other essentialisms, have continued both to renew cultural sameness, and to emphasize the ambiguous cultural differences between Brazilians and the Portuguese. Within the continuing hierarchy Portugal imposes on the former colonies, Brazilians have continued to occupy the highest rank, accenting the ambiguity of their relationship with Portugal.
The interchanges between cultural sameness and difference marks the *Return of the Caravels,* which stirs, in the second act, the dramatic new reversed crossings of people, symbols, and capital between Portugal and Brazil. In the context of those reversed crossings in the global economy, Portuguese governmental officers have reconstructed old imperial imageries as a way of re-creating Portugal as a “modern” European nation. The official narratives today bring together the politics of high culture and the politics of investments. They represent yet another reconfiguration of an expansionist Portuguese nationalism. In view of the ongoing internationalization of the economy, the Portuguese post-colonial state, together with Portugal’s investors and enterprises, have turned once more to the former colonial spaces, which have today been transmuted into a supranational “Portuguese language territory.” Accordingly, the cultural sameness between former colonizer and its major colony has been evoked against the background of a lusophone world. As the Brazilian government began sponsoring the politics of privatization, Brazil, long viewed by the Portuguese as its “major creation,” has further turned into the major market for Portugal’s investors and enterprises. Without its burden of colonialism, capitalist Portugal’s future seems to be in Brazil.

This territory of the Portuguese language has also included the Portuguese diaspora. For more than a century, endless debate asked whether emigration was a problem or a solution for the nation-state dilemmas. After the end of empire, the diasporic population was incorporated into a European nation based on common descent. At first that incorporation, besides making possible the reconstruction of imperial Portugal’s “magical dimension,” (Lourengo 1978) aimed at promoting social justice and citizens’ rights. While this incorporation has undoubtly represented a drastic change from the former dictatorial regime’s exclusionary policies towards emigrants, some reconstructed continuity remains.
Like the New State dictatorship, the Portuguese governmental authorities have delimited differing access to Portuguese associations in dialogues and negotiations with the post-colonial state. Moreover, as they have progressively focused on leading citizens capable of playing roles as transnational brokers for the Portuguese state and its entrepreneurial missions, these successful Portuguese have been portrayed once more as “heroic entrepreneurs” and equated to the “heroes of the sea.”

In a similar manner, surpassing the previous market for nostalgia and the demand for immigrants’ remittances to Portugal, Portuguese enterprises and investors looking for the broader Brazilian markets have also relied on some long-established associations in the diaspora. They have also begun to consider the Portuguese in Brazil as potential clients and consumers.

In the context of the ongoing interest in the Brazilian market and the possibility of joint adventures, government officials have renewed emphasis on the rhetoric of brotherhood binding Brazil and Portugal and, thus, on the production of sameness. But the ongoing policies of the Portuguese government, along with the increased Portuguese investments in Brazil, have at the same time helped to revive Portugueseness and, as a corollary, the production of cultural differences between Portuguese and Brazilians. Given Portugal’s “metamorphosis” into a modern and prosperous European nation and the ongoing re-creation of old images centering on a revived Atlantic universal vocation, the renewed differentiation again places emphasis on the Portuguese as white European colonizers, responsible for the evangelization and, thus, “civilization” of Brazil. Although stereotyped and farcical, this re-creation fits with the present construction of a nationalism that joins the politics of investment and the marketing of high culture. This national reconfiguration implicitly portrays Portugal as European—civilized and white—inasmuch as Portuguese officials in their attempts to construct homogeneity have once again
promoted positive miscegenation and, therefore, have attempted to disguise the actual bonds between
race and nation. In the midst of the increasing politics of differentiation among the leading citizens of the
Portuguese diaspora of São Paulo, however, some elderly activists at the 25 of April Cultural Center
still contest this national construction.
NOTES

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I used the expression “Atlantic projects” to refer indistinctly both to the Portuguese Second Empire (directed to the colonization of Brazil) as well as its Third Empire (aimed at the colonization of Africa).
The Treaty of Schegen, like that of Maastricht and later Amsterdam, aimed at unifying the national policies of the states that are members of the European regional economic block. The Treaty of Schegen first endorsed in 1985 by seven state-members (such as Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal) was designed at providing free movement within the European Union for the populations of each state-member. While removing internal borders, the treaty strengthened control over European borders. The treaty was based upon cooperation among the state members to reinforce control over borders, including the tightening of rules on deportation and the fight against drugs traffic (Europe 1996 in Santos 1996).

Caravels are the Portuguese vessels of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries era of maritime explorations.

I resort particularly to Brazilian press coverage, available at the “Nation and Diaspora” data bank, CEMI-IFCH/UNICAMP.

I conducted intensive fieldwork research among the Portuguese of New Bedford, MA. from September 1986 to June 30, 1991 while the Visiting University Professor of Portuguese Studies at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, Dartmouth, MA. Since then, I have made short fieldwork trips to New Bedford. Systematic fieldwork among the Portuguese of São Paulo and the Brazilians in Lisbon that I conducted together with a team of graduate and undergraduate students started in 1996 following preliminary research. These three case studies provided the basis of my comparative project Portuguese Immigrants, Brazilian Immigrants: Globalization, Old Imaginings and Reconstruction of Identities. This project is part of the
research program *Identities: Reconfigurations of Culture and Power: Case-Studies on the transnational movements of populations, signs and capital* I direct at CEMI – IFCH/UNICAMP, funded by, PRONEX (Program in support of centers of excellence), Ministry of Science and Technology, Brazil (1997-2001).

7 According to Baganha M. I and P. Góis (1999), Brazilians and immigrants from Portuguese Africa belong to different segments of Portugal’s foreign population. The Brazilians, along with Europeans, are located at the top of the Portuguese socioeconomic and professional structure. In comparison, citizens coming from the new African nations of Portuguese Official Expression, together with growing numbers of nationals from Zaire, Senegal, and (more recently) from Eastern European nations— are located at the bottom of the Portuguese socioeconomic and professional structure.

8 There was a special demand for professionals in advertising, television broadcasting, engineering, computation, dentistry as well as those professions that deal with the body concerns (physiotherapy, dance, massages etc), among others.

9 That bilateral treaty was an outcome of negotiations between Portugal and Brazil concerning the resettlement of massive numbers of Portuguese immigrants who, after fleeing the colonial wars of Africa, returned to Portugal. With the promulgation of that treaty, many resettled in Brazil.

10 According to *Folha de São Paulo* of January 28, 1993, the Portuguese government also noted that there was not any gratuitous ill will against Brazilians.
Among others, the Federation of Portuguese and Luso-Brazilian Associations of Rio de Janeiro, the Council of the Luso-Brazilian Community of São Paulo State, the Luso-Brazilian Community Center of Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais in Brazil; and, in Portugal, the Lisbon’s House of Brazil and the Luso-Brazilian Foundation for the Advancement of the Portuguese Language.

_Afirmar Portugal no Mundo_ (Assert Portugal in the World) is the title of a book with CavacoSilva’s speeches.


The most active were the Capeverdean Association, the Guinea-Bissau Social Solidarity Association, The Angolan Recreational Association, a Mozambican Association and Lisbon’s House of Brazil.

Therefore, they were not recreated by reason of essentialized and personalized characteristics, as in Freyre’s notion of “Brazilian and Portuguese” plasticity, or on account of a Portuguese “Culture of the Border” (as analysed by Santos 1993).

Janio Quadros resigned from office seven months after he was elected President of Brazil.

These differential categories are reminders of the Portuguese Constitution of 1911, which indicated the need for specific laws corresponding to each colony’s stage of civilization. Later, the 1930 Colonial Act, still influenced by the social Darwinist thesis of the superiority of the
white European race, aimed at “possessing and colonizing the overseas dominions (of Africa) and of civilizing the indigenous populations” (Alexandre 2000: 189). But since the natives of Cape Verde received citizen status instead, the indigenous category did not apply equally to all African colonies (Thomaz 1997).

During New State dictatorship, the Tenth of June was known as the Day of Portugal, Camões and of the Portuguese Race. In 1977, the post-colonial state recreated the Tenth of June as a celebration of the Portuguese diaspora. Thereby the Portuguese communities abroad replaced the former colonial dominions in a new expanded construction of a “global” Portuguese nation based on descent rather than territory (Feldman-Bianco 1992).

The Portuguese economic community was made up of Portugal and its overseas dominions of Africa.

Rocha Trindade (1984) pointed out that since an estimated four million Portuguese were spread throughout 96 countries, post-colonial governmental officials decided to engage in permanent dialogues with the Portuguese emigrant associations.

Including the former Council of the Portuguese Communities formed by seventy Portuguese associations of São Paulo state. Some of the older associations were originally mutual aid societies, that later turned either into “promoters of Portuguese culture” or “recreational” associations. In a few cases, former mutual societies were transformed into major health insurance enterprises, as for instance the Clube Trasmontano that, in addition, continues to sponsor cultural and recreation activities.
However, in 1941, the presidency of the House of Portugal was won by a supporter of a Salazar who stayed in office for twenty-six years, changing therefore the profile of that association (Verdasca 1993).

The celebratory events were held between April 1999 and April 2000. In the words of a Portuguese intellectual who lives in São Paulo (Brazil) and is active at the 25 of April Cultural Center “I am irritated that someone who has never showed any interest on culture now poses as intellectual of the colony, speaking on Portugal’s behalf. That person was, in the past, an agent of a regime that forbade the free manifestation of ideas. Presently, he gets grants and has establishes himself as representative of such activities. I disagree with the character of such cultural products.”

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